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The public interest in maintaining a balanced and functioning government continues to force Trump`s immunity claims to be denied in these cases. Given that the complainants do not dispute any of Trump`s official conduct, public policy considerations that might justify shielding a president from responsibility for his or her official duties are inappropriate in this case. Even if a court were to deem it appropriate to immunize a president for unofficial conduct so as not to deter official conduct, it would be particularly inappropriate in this case to immunize that behavior because it was designed to prevent a branch of the federal government from fulfilling its constitutional responsibility. In other words, letting Trump get away with his alleged attempt to use “force, intimidation or threat” to prevent constitutional certification of election results and orderly transfer of power would only undermine the public interest in maintaining a functioning government and the rule of law. And as if this mere application of the Supreme Court`s precedent were not enough, the principles of separation of powers and public policy considerations underlying the court`s immunity precedent compel Trump to reject the claim for absolute immunity. 833 An implied cause of action against public servants accused of constitutional violations was accepted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Butz v.

Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a Bivens trial, the court distinguished between common law offenses and unconstitutional acts and denied absolute immunity to senior federal officials, including cabinet secretaries, in favor of the qualified immunity previously granted to senior officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court denied absolute presidential immunity to presidential advisers, but changed the rules of qualified immunity, making it more difficult for such aides, other federal officials, and even state and local officials to be held accountable for unconstitutional acts. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Court granted qualified immunity to the Attorney General for authorizing warrantless wiretapping in a national security case. Although the court later found that such warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment, this interpretation was not “clearly established” at the time of the Attorney General`s approval, and Harlow protected officials exercising their discretion on these open questions. See also Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (in a highly opaque opinion, the court granted similar qualified immunity to FBI agents who conducted a warrantless search). These arguments are constitutionally flawed. In Clinton v. Jones, the Supreme Court clarified that presidential immunity applies only to the president`s official actions, not to his unofficial conduct. Of course, President Trump could not perform an official act of the president before taking office. Under U.S. law, absolute immunity is a type of sovereign immunity for government officials that grants full immunity from lawsuits and damages actions as long as officials are acting within the scope of their duties. [1] The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that government officials deserve some form of immunity from damages claims,[2] and that the common law recognizes this immunity. [2] The Court maintains that this immunity is necessary to protect public servants from undue interference with the performance of their duties and from “potentially obstructive threats of liability.” [2] These cases are therefore very different from the Fitzgerald case, in which the Court held that the President enjoys absolute immunity from liability for civil damages. In Fitzgerald, the Court of First Instance held that the contested decision `clearly …

within the constitutional and statutory powers of the President” and was in fact “mandated” by his office. Far from being “mandated” by the bureau, Trump`s actions as a disgruntled candidate—including encouraging a mob of thousands to infiltrate the “people`s house” and forcibly preventing Congress from exercising its own official duties—were neither constitutionally nor legally authorized. In short, they were not official, and Trump has no right to invoke immunity for these private acts simply because he was president when he committed them. 828 For example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (action ordered by Secretary of Commerce to return steel mills seized by order of the President); Ladies & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Lawsuit against the Minister of Finance to have the President`s Order on Iranian Assets quashed).

See also Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U.S. 165 (1893); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912). In a letter to the Supreme Court, 37 former Republican officials argue that President Trump`s claim to absolute immunity from prosecution is legally false and violates constitutional values. As part of Protect Democracy`s work to roll back President Trump`s claims to full immunity from accountability, Protect Democracy and Republicans for the Rule of Law have joined forces through the Presidential Accountability Project to combat the arbitrary use of presidential power and uphold constitutional laws.